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Abstract
The paper introduces assets whose dividends can take any value (positive,
negative or zero) in a dynamic general equilibrium model with financial market
imperfections. We investigate the interplay between the asset markets and the
production sector. The behavior of asset price and value is also studied.
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1 Introduction
The standard literature of asset pricing (Lucas, 1978; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012;
Asparouhova et al., 2016) considers that dividends of assets are positive. However,
recently some central banks and governments issue assets with negative nominal interest
rates (see Figures 1, 2 below). Such these assets may have interpretation: once we buy
an asset (money, for example), we will (1) be able to resell it, and (2) have to pay an
amount (instead of receiving an amount as in the case of positive dividend). Motivated
by this fact, our paper investigates the behavior of prices and values of assets whose
dividends (or yields) may take any value (negative, positive or zero), and the interplay
between the asset markets and the production sector.
To do so, we build an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with a production
sector and an imperfect financial market. There are a finite number of heterogeneous
consumers and one representative firm (without market power). Consumers have two
choices for investing: buy physical capital and/or buy a long-lived asset (whose initial
supply is exogenous and positive) which brings dividends in the future (similar to the
Lucas tree). The novelty is that asset dividend at each period may be positive, negative
or zero.
Without the positivity of asset dividends, it is not trivial that asset prices are
positive because it is possible that nobody buys this asset; in such a case, issuing
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Figure 1: Policy rate on excess reserves, percent
Figure 2: Two-year government bond yields
Source: The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, June 2015.
assets with negative dividend has no effect on the economy. Hence, we may interpret
that one can run negative dividend policy if there exists an equilibrium where asset
prices are positive at all dates.
The first set of our contribution is to find out conditions under which we can
run negative dividend policy. We show that negative dividend policies cannot be
sustained without a strong production sector or high endowments. The idea behind is
the following. If one agent buys asset whose future dividends are negative, she will be
able to resell this asset but have to pay an amount at the same time. If this amount
is so high (i.e., negative dividend is so low), her income including that from capital
may be not enough to cover this amount; this can happen if the production sector is
weak or endowments are low. In this case, no one wants to buy assets with negative
dividends, which implies in turn that asset prices must be zero.
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We also prove that when asset dividends are negative at any period, there is no
equilibrium with positive asset prices and borrowing constraints are not binding. We
then provide examples where agents cannot borrow and asset dividends are negative
at any date but asset prices are positive. Let us explain the intuition of this example
where we assume that there is a fluctuation on endowments, which in turn creates a
fluctuation on agents’ income. Consider a date: Agents, who have low endowment
at the next date and cannot borrow, have to transfer their wealth from the present
date to the next period, hence they accept to buy financial asset in the present date
with positive prices even this asset brings negative dividends in the future. The same
argument is applied for other dates and agents. Therefore, asset prices are positive at
all periods. This result is stronger than the existence of fiat money, i.e., asset without
dividend has positive price (Bewley, 1980; Tirole, 1985; Pascoa et al., 2011), and the
existence of rational bubbles, i.e., the asset price is higher than the present value of
future dividends (Santos and Woodford, 1997; Le Van and Pham, 2016), in the general
equilibrium context.
Our second contribution is to identify conditions under which we should run negative
dividend policy, i.e., we study the optimal distribution of dividends, given that the
objective is the welfare. We find out that, when the productivity in the future is high
enough, the government should issue an asset in the present, which will have negative
dividend in the future. This action will provide investment for production sector, which
will bring a high return because the productivity in the future is high. This suggests
that while a central bank encourages people to invest by reducing interest rates (ECB,
2014), it is important for the economy to stimulate investments in R&D in order to
improve the productivity in the future. Moreover, our analyses indicate that when
the aggregate resource of the economy is low today, dividend at this date should be
positive because asset dividend can provide financial support for the purchase of the
physical capital, and then increase investment.
The last set of our contribution concerns the behavior of asset price and value. Let
us denote qt and ξt the equilibrium asset price (in terms of consumption good) and
asset dividend at date t. Given that the asset supply is positive at any date, we have,
as in Santos and Woodford (1997), so-called no-arbitrage condition
qt = γt+1(qt+1 + ξt+1) (1)
where γt+1 is the endogenous discount factor of the economy from date t to t+ 1. By
iterating (1), we get the following decomposition
q0 =
( T∑
t=1
Qtξt
)
+QT qT (2)
where Qt ≡ γ1 · · · γt is the endogenous discount factor of the economy from date 0 to
t.
In the standard theory,1 ξt is assumed to be positive for any t. So,
∑T
t=1Qtξt
is increasing in T , which implies that the discounted asset value QT qT decreasingly
converges to some value. When QT qT converges to zero, we can compute the asset
1See Tirole (1982), Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997), Le Van and Pham (2016)
among others.
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price by q0 =
∑∞
t=1Qtξt; this kind of equilibrium is referred to no-bubble equilibrium
(Tirole, 1982; Kocherlakota, 1992; Santos and Woodford, 1997; Le Van and Pham,
2016).
We point out, by some examples, that when asset dividends (ξt) may be negative,
the sum ∑Tt=1Qtξt may diverge, and the discounted asset value QT qT may diverge or
converge to any value (even converge to infinity). Our examples are not trivial because∑T
t=1Qtξt converges to q0 if intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of agents are
the same or borrowing constraints are never binding (or without financial frictions).
We also show that asset prices (qt) may fluctuate over time. Interestingly, there are
some cases where asset prices are zero at infinitely many dates and positive at other
dates. These findings show how hard is the searching for a robust result on prices and
values of assets whose dividends may be negative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our
framework and presents some basic properties of equilibria. Section 3 provides analyses
of equilibrium with positive asset prices by studying the interaction between asset
market and production sector. In Section 4, we investigate asset valuation and provide
some examples illustrating and complementing our theoretical results. Section 5 concludes.
Technical proofs are gathered in Appendix A.
2 Framework
Our model is based on Lucas (1978), Santos and Woodford (1997) and Le Van
and Pham (2016). The novelty is that we do not require the positivity of dividends.
In additional, different from Lucas (1978), Santos and Woodford (1997), we introduce
capital accumulation. However, for simplicity, we assume that consumers are prevented
from borrowing.
Time is discrete and runs from 0 to ∞. There are a finite number of households.
Let us denote I ≡ {1, 2, · · · ,m} the set of households.
Consumption good. There is a single consumption good at each date. At period
t, the price of consumption good is denoted by pt and agent i consumes ci,t units of
consumption good.
Physical capital. Let us denote rt the capital return at date t and δ the depreciation
rate, ki,t+1 the quantity of physical capital bought by agent i at date t.
Financial asset. At period t, if agent i buys ai,t units of financial asset with price
qt, she will receive ξt+1 units of consumption good as dividend and she will be able
to resell ai,t units of financial asset with price qt+1. Note that ξt may take any value
(negative, positive or zero). When ξt = 0 for any t, the asset becomes fiat money as in
Bewley (1980), Pascoa et al. (2011) or pure bubble asset as in Tirole (1985), Hirano
and Yanagawa (2017). When ξt > 0 for any t, we recover the Lucas’ tree in Lucas
(1978), or security in Santos and Woodford (1997) or stock in Kocherlakota (1992).
Each household i takes the sequence of prices (p, q, r) = (pt, qt, rt)∞t=0 as given and
chooses allocation sequences (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)∞t=0 to maximize her intertemporal utility.
The utility maximization problem of agent i is the following:
(Pi(p, q, r)) : max
(ci,t,ki,t+1,ai,t)∞t=0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ci,t)
]
(3)
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subject to
ki,t+1 ≥ 0, ai,t ≥ 0, (4)
pt(ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1− δ)ki,t) + qtai,t ≤ rtki,t + (qt + ptξt)ai,t−1 + ptei,t + θitpit, (5)
where ei ≡ (ei,t) is the sequence of endowment of agent i while pit is the profit of the
firm at date t (see below). (θit)mi=1 is the share of profit at date t. θi ≡ (θit)t is exogenous,
θit ≥ 0 for all i and
∑m
i=1 θ
i
t = 1.
For each period t, there is a representative firm which takes prices (pt, rt) as given
and maximizes its profit by choosing physical capital amount Kt.
(P (pt, rt)) : pit ≡ max
Kt≥0
[
ptF (Kt)− rtKt
]
(6)
Denote E the economy which is characterized by a list(
(ui, βi, ei, ki,0, ai,−1, θi)mi=1, F, δ, (ξt)∞t=0
)
.
Definition 1. Consider the economy E. A sequence of prices and quantities(
pt, qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)mi=1, Kt
)∞
t=0
is an equilibrium of the economy E if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) Price positivity: pt > 0, rt > 0 and qt ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0.
(ii) Market clearing: at each t ≥ 0,∑
i∈I
(ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1− δ)ki,t) = et + F (Kt) + ξt
∑
i∈I
ai,t−1 (7)
Kt =
∑
i∈I
ki,t, (8)∑
i∈I
(ai,t − ai,t−1) ≤ 0, qt
∑
i∈I
(ai,t − ai,t−1) = 0 (9)
where et ≡ ∑i∈I ei,t is the aggregate endowment of the economy.
(iii) Optimal allocation plan: for each i, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)∞t=0 is a solution of the problem
(Pi(p, q, r)).
(iv) Optimal production plan: for each t ≥ 0, Kt is a solution of the problem (P (pt, rt)).
Comments. In this definition, we do not require that qt > 0 for any t. The
asset’s market clearing condition (9) is in the spirit of Arrow and Debreu (1954), and∑
i∈I(ai,t − ai,t−1) = 0 if price qt > 0. As we will mention below, in some cases where
asset dividends are not positive, it is not easy to find out an equilibrium with qt > 0
for any t. In condition (7), the term ξt
∑
i∈I ai,t−1 will be ξt if
∑
i∈I ai,t−1 = 1. However,
when nobody buys asset, we have ∑i∈I ai,t−1 = 0.
Standard assumptions are required in our paper.
Assumption (H1): ui is in C1, u′i(0) = +∞, and ui is strictly increasing, concave.
Assumption (H2): F (·) is in C1, strictly increasing, concave, F (0) = 0.
Assumption (H3): At initial period 0, ki,0, ai,−1 ≥ 0, and (ki,0, ai,−1) 6= (0, 0) for
i = 1, . . . ,m. Moreover, we assume that ∑mi=1 ai,−1 = 1 and K0 ≡ ∑mi=1 ki,0 > 0.
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Definition 2. Given (ξt), we say that a positive sequence of consumption and capital
(Ct, Kt) is feasible if Ct +Kt+1 ≤ et + F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt for any t.
Let (Dt) be defined by
D0 ≡ e0 + F (K0) + (1− δ)K0 +max(0, ξ0), (10)
Dt ≡ et + F (Dt−1) + (1− δ)Dt−1 +max(0, ξt) ∀t ≥ 0. (11)
We see that Dt is exogenous and depends on the function F and K0, δ, ξ1, . . . , ξt.
Moreover, Ct +Kt+1 ≤ Dt for every t ≥ 0. This leads to the following result.
Lemma 1 (the boundedness of consumption and capital stocks). Consider a feasible
path (Ct, Kt). We have
1. Capital and consumption are in a compact set for the product topology.
2. Moreover, they are uniformly bounded if (et)t and (ξt)t are uniformly bounded
from above and there exists x0 such that F (x) + (1− δ)x+ supt(et + ξt) ≤ x for
every x ≥ x0.
One can prove that conditions in point 2 are satisfied if supt(et + ξt) < ∞ and
F ′(∞) < δ.
The following assumption ensures that utility of each agent is finite.
Assumption (H4): For each agent i,
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(Dt(F, δ,K0, ξ0, . . . , ξt)) <∞. (12)
Price normalization. Since the utility function ui is strictly increasing, at any
equilibrium (if it exists), pt must be positive for any t. So, without loss of generality, we
can normalize by setting pt = 1 for any t. In this case, we also call
(
qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)mi=1, Kt
)
t
equilibrium.
2.1 Basis properties
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition to verify that a list of prices and
allocations is an equilibrium.
Lemma 2.
(
qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)mi=1, Kt
)
t
is an equilibrium if and only if there exist
sequences (σi,t, νi,t)i,t such that the following conditions are satisfied, for any i and for
any t,
(i) ci,t > 0, ki,t+1 > 0, ai,t > 0, σi,t > 0, νi,t > 0, Kt > 0, qt ≥ 0, rt > 0.
(ii) First order conditions:
1
rt+1 + 1− δ =
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
+ σi,t, σi,tki,t+1 = 0
qt
qt+1 + ξt+1
= βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
+ νi,t, νi,tai,t = 0.
6
(iii) Transversality condition:
lim
t→∞ β
t
iu
′
i(ci,t)(ki,t+1 + qtai,t) = 0. (13)
(iv) F (Kt)− rtKt = max{F (k)− rtk : k > 0}.
(v) ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1− δ)ki,t + qtai,t = rtki,t + (qt + ξt)ai,t−1 + θitpit + ei,t
where pit = F (Kt)− rtKt.
(vi) Kt =
∑
i∈I ki,t
(vii) ∑
i∈I
(ai,t − ai,t−1) ≤ 0, and ∑
i∈I
(ai,t − ai,t−1) = 0 if qt > 0.
Transversality condition (13) which is not trivial can be proved by adapting the
argument in the proof of Theorem 1 in Kamihigashi (2002). The proof of Lemma
2 is left to the reader. The readers are referred to Araujo et al. (2002), Pascoa et
al. (2011), Bosi et al. (2017) for similar conditions in economies with uncertainty,
incomplete markets and collateral constraints.
Remark 1. Consider a finite T -period economy. If ξt ≤ 0 for any t ≤ T , there does
not exist an equilibrium with qt > 0 for any t ≤ T − 1.
Let us denote, for each t ≥ 0, γi,t+1 (respectively, Qi,t) the agent i’s discount factor
from date t to date t+ 1 (respectively, from initial date to date t) as follows.
γi,t+1 ≡ βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
, Qi,0 = 1, Qi,t ≡ γi,t · · · γit. (14)
We also define γt+1 the discount factor of the economy from date t to t+ 1 and Qt
the discount factor of the economy from date 0 to t
γt+1 ≡ max
i
{
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
}
, Q0 = 1, Qt ≡ γ1 · · · γt. (15)
According to point (iii) of Lemma 2, we have so-called non-arbitrage inequalities.
Lemma 3. At equilibrium, we have, for each t,
qt ≥ γt+1(qt+1 + ξt+1) with equality if
∑
i
ai,t > 0 (16)
1 ≥ γt+1(rt+1 + 1− δ) with equality if Kt+1 > 0 (17)
Note that Qtki,t+1 = (1− δ + rt+1)Qt+1ki,t+1 for any t and for any i.
In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on equilibria where all prices are
positive, i.e. qt > 0 for any t. In this case, we have
∑
i ai,t = 1 for any t, and therefore
qt = γt+1(qt+1 + ξt+1). (18)
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3 Negative dividend and production
The asset in our framework can be interpreted as an asset issued by the government
who can choose negative dividends at some or all dates. However, such an action has
no effect on the economy if the asset price is zero or nobody buys the asset. This
motivates us to introduce the following notion.
Definition 3. We say that the government can run negative dividend policy if there
exists an equilibrium with qt > 0 for any t.
The aim of this section is to find out conditions under which the government can
run negative dividend policy.
3.1 Can we run negative dividend policy?
First, we consider the case where asset dividend at only one date may be negative.
We have the following result.
Proposition 1. Assume that Assumptions (H1)-(H4) hold and ui(0) = 0 for any i.
Consider a date s∗ ≥ 0. Assume that ξt ≥ 0 for any t 6= s∗, and there is an infinite
sequence (ξtn)n such that ξtn > 0 for any t. Then, there exists ξ¯ > 0 such that: for any
ξs∗ ≥ −ξ¯, there exists an equilibrium with qt > 0 for any t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
According to this result, the existence of equilibrium is ensured if asset dividend at
some date is negative but not far from zero (in the sense that Bi,t > 0). In particular,
we recover the existence result in Le Van and Pham (2016) for the case ξt > 0 ∀t.
In what follows, we will consider more general cases where dividends at any date
may be negative. We start by pointing out the behavior of asset price and value in the
very long run.
Lemma 4. Assume that 0 < lim inft→∞ ξt ≤ lim supt→∞ ξt < +∞,2 and conditions
in point 2 of Lemma 1 hold. Then, for any equilibrium, we have lim
t→∞Qtqt = 0 and
qs =
∑∞
t=s+1Qtξt/Qs for each s ≥ 0. Consequently, qt > 0 when t is high enough.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 4 provides a sufficient condition under which the present value ∑∞t=1Qtξt
converges. Moreover, the equilibrium price at any date is equal to the present value of
future dividends, which is equivalent to the fact that the discounted value of asset will
converge to zero, i.e. limt→∞Qtqt = 0. Lemma 4 also gives a sufficient condition under
which asset prices are positive in the very long run. Notice that under assumptions
in Lemma 4, aggregate consumption and capital stocks are uniformly bounded from
above.
Some interesting consequences of Lemma 4 should be mentioned.
2Note that there may be some t such that ξt < 0.
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Corollary 1. Assume that 0 < lim inf
t→∞ ξt ≤ lim supt→∞ ξt < +∞, and conditions in point
2 of Lemma 1 hold. Let us consider a date s ≥ 0 such that ξs < 0. Consider an
equilibrium.
1. If qs−1 > 0, then
∑∞
t=s+1Qtξt > Qs|ξs| > 0.
2. If Kt > 0 for any t ≥ 0, then we have
∞∑
t=s+1
(F ′(0) + 1− δ)t−s|ξt| ≥ |ξs| > 0.
Point 1 in Corollary 1 indicates that when dividend at some date, say s, is negative,
the asset price at date (s− 1) is positive only if the present value of dividends at date
s is strictly higher than the absolute discounted value of asset at this date. Note that
when conditions 0 < lim inft→∞ ξt ≤ lim supt→∞ ξt < +∞ are violated,
∑∞
t≥s+1Qtξt
may be lower than Qs|ξs|; this property will be readdressed in Section 4.2. Point 2
in Corollary 1 complements Proposition 1 by providing an upper bound of −ξs when
ξs < 0. This upper bound depends on productivity and future dividends.
Using transversality condition (13) in Lemma 2, we have the following result showing
the role of intertemporal marginal rates of substitutions γi,t+1 ≡ βiu′i(ci,t+1)/u′i(ci,t).
Proposition 2 (role of agents’ heterogeneity).
1. If there is a date t0 such that γi,t = γt for any t > t0 and for any i, then
limt→∞Qtqt = 0 and Qtqt =
∑∞
s=t+1Qsξs
2. Consequently, if ξt ≤ 0 for any t, then there is no equilibrium with positive prices
such that γi,t = γt for any t, i or ai,t > 0 for any t, i.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
According to Proposition 2, when all dividends are negative, there is no equilibrium
with positive prices in which the intertemporal marginal rates of substitutions are the
same at any period (this happens if agents are identical). The intuition is the following:
when the intertemporal marginal rates of substitutions are the same, agents’ investment
behavior are similar; in such a case, nobody buys assets with negative dividends. So,
asset prices are zero at any date.
If borrowing constraint ai,t ≥ 0 is not binding for any i, we have γi,t+1 = γt+1. By
the way, point 2 of Proposition 2 indicates the role of borrowing constraints: When all
dividends are negative, at each equilibrium with positive prices, there exist an agent
i and an infinite sequence (tn)n≥1 such that ai,tn = 0 for any n ≥ 1. Section 4.2 will
provide some examples where ξt ≤ 0 for any t, asset prices are positive, and borrowing
constraints are frequently binding.
We now analyze the role of productivity. We prepare our exposition by an intermediate
step.
Lemma 5. If there exists an equilibrium with qt > 0 ∀t, then ξt is bounded from below
by an exogenous parameter: ξt ≥ −et − F (Dt−1) − (1 − δ)Dt−1 for any t, where the
sequence (Dt)t is defined by (10) and (11).
Proof. If an equilibrium exists, we have 0 ≤ Ct + Kt+1 ≤ F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt. By
definition of (Dt), we see that ξt ≥ −F (Dt−1)− (1− δ)Dt−1.
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Lemma 5 indicates that the existence of equilibrium with positive prices (qt > 0
for any t) requires that asset dividends must be bounded from below by exogenous
parameters. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 (role of productivity). Assume that et = 0 for any t.
1. Assume that there exists d such that ξt ≤ −d < 0 for any t. If F ′(0) < δ and
F (0) = 0, then there is no equilibrium with qt > 0 for any t.
2. (collapse). Assume that ξt ≤ 0 for any t, F ′(0) < δ and F (0) = 0. If there exists
an equilibrium with qt > 0 for any t, then lim
t→∞ ξt = 0 and limt→∞Kt = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The first point shows that when dividends are negative and bounded above by a
negative constant, there is no equilibrium with positive prices if the productivity is low.
Point 2 of Proposition 3 indicates that when dividends are negative and productivity
is low, an equilibrium exists only if dividends tend to zero and in this case the economy
will collapse (aggregate consumption stocks converge to zero).
Let us explain the economic intuition of our result. When asset prices are positive
at any date, there are always some agents who buy this asset. At any date, if one agent
buys asset whose future dividends are negative, she will be able to resell this asset but
have to pay an amount at the same time. In the aggregate level, the economy has to
finance an amount (corresponding to negative dividends) at any date, which is bounded
away from zero (−ξt > d > 0). However, when productivity is very low (F ′(0) < δ),
the production level decreases in time and tends to zero, the economy collapses. By
consequence, there will be some period when the resource of the economy will not be
enough to cover negative dividends. Therefore, asset prices cannot be positive.
Propositions 1 and 3 suggest that negative dividend policies may be sustained only
if (1) the production sector is strong enough (high productivity) and (2) dividends are
not so low.
3.2 Should we run negative dividend policy? Optimal dividend
distribution
In this section, we wonder whether we should run negative dividend policies or not.
It is reasonable to assume that the government chooses dividends in order to maximize
the welfare of agents in the decentralized economy.
Since we are interested in the role of productivity, we allow for non-stationary
production functions: the production function at date t is given by Ft(K) = AtF (K),
where F is strictly increasing, strictly concave, F (0) = 0, F ′(0) =∞, F (∞) =∞, and
At ≥ 0 represents the total-factor productivity (TFP) of the economy..
For the sake of tractability, we assume that there is one representative household
with instantaneous utility function u, the rate of time preference β ∈ (0, 1), and
non-negative endowments (et). The agent’s allocation is denoted by (ct, kt+1, at)t≥0.
In this case, according to the definition of equilibrium, we have at = 1 and rt = F ′t(kt),
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and therefore the welfare function which depends on (ξt) is given by
W ((ξt)t≥0) ≡ max
(ct,kt+1)t≥0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
(19)
subject to: kt+1 ≥ 0, ct + kt+1 ≤ Gt(kt) + et + ξt (20)
where Gt(k) = (1− δ)k + Ft(k).
By the concavity of u and Gt, one can prove that the function W ((ξ)t) is concave
in (ξt).
Assume that the government’s problem is to maximize the welfare function by
choosing the sequence of dividend (ξt) subject to
ξt ≥ −bt ∀t ≥ 0, and
∞∑
t=0
ξt ≤ B, (21)
where B ≥ 0, bt > 0 for any t. Within this setup, the government, having an
endowment B ≥ 0 units of consumption good, has to distribute dividends across
periods. The government can choose negative dividend at each date but there is a
lower bound bt.
To find out the properties of the government’s optimal choice (ξt), we will study
the following problem.
(PW ) : max
(ct,kt+,ξt)t
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
(22)
subject to: kt+1 ≥ 0, (23)
ct + kt+1 ≤ Gt(kt) + et + ξt (24)
ξt ≥ −bt (25)∑
t
ξt ≤ B. (26)
We assume that (bt) is not so high so that the set of choices of the problem (PW)
is not empty. Therefore, the problem (PW) has a solution.
Notice that the non-standard optimal growth problem (PW) is non-stationary and
has no closed-form solution. Moreover, it is not easy to find out global property of the
solution. Here, we can provide some qualitative analysis. The following result shows
the role of productivity.
Proposition 4. Let assumptions in this section be satisfied and u(∞) =∞, u′(∞) = 0.
Fix a date t and all parameters, except At. Then, there exists A¯t such that each solution
of the problem (PW) satisfies: ξt = −bt < 0 for any At ≥ A¯t.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The intuition of Proposition 4 is the following. Let us interpret date (t− 1) as the
present and date t as the future. When the productivity in the future is high enough,
the government should issue an asset in the present which will have negative dividend
in the future. This action provides investment for the production sector, which will
bring a high return because the productivity in the future is high.
Proposition 4 has an interesting consequence.
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Corollary 2. Let assumptions in this section be satisfied and u(∞) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0.
Assume that the government can only choose ξ0, ξ1 such that ξ0 ≥ −b0, ξ1 ≥ −b1 and
ξ0 + ξ1 ≤ D where D > 0.
Fix all parameters, except A1. There exists A¯1 such that at optimal, ξ1 = −b1 < 0
and ξ0 = D + b1 > 0 for any A1 ≥ A¯1.
This result complements Proposition 4. It indicates the moments when the government
should choose positive and negative dividends. Dividend should be positive today if
the productivity in the future is high enough because in this case asset dividend can
provide financial support for the purchase of the physical capital, and then increase
investment.
3.2.1 A closed-form solution
In order to see more clearly economic intuitions, this section provides an example
where we can find a closed-form solution. Consider a two-period model. Assume that
u(c) = ln(c). Assume also that δ = 1, Ft(k) = Atk1/2 for t = 0, 1. The welfare
function, which depends on ξ0, ξ1, is defined by
W (ξ0, ξ1) ≡ max
(c0,k1,c1)
[
ln(c0) + βln(c1)
]
subject to: k1 ≥ 0,
c0 + k1 ≤ A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0
c1 ≤ A1k1/21 + e1 + ξ1.
The standard Euler equation u′(c0) = βu′(c1)12A1k
−1/2
1 implies that
(1 + β 12)A1k1 + (e1 +D − ξ0)k
1/2
1 − β
1
2A1(A0k
1/2
0 + e0 + ξ0) = 0.
Some comments should be mentioned here.
• It is easy to see that when ξ0 increases, k1 increases.
• Since ξ0 + ξ1 is constant, if we decrease ξ1, then ξ0 and so k1 increases, therefore
the interest rate on the capital market r1 = 12A1k
−1/2
1 decreases. This corresponds
to what the banks wanted to do: decrease the interest rate to enhance investment
(see for example ECB (2014)).
When ξ0 increases, the aggregate at initial date (A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0) and production
at next date (A1k1/21 ) increase but ξ1 decreases. So, the consumption at next date
(A1k1/21 + e1 + ξ1) may decrease, and therefore it is not trivial that the welfare is an
increasing function of ξ0. The following example gives a closed-form solution for the
optimal level of dividend distribution (ξ0, ξ1).
Example 1 (A closed-form solution). Assume that the government chooses ξ0, ξ1 such
that ξ0 ≥ −b0, ξ1 ≥ −b1 and ξ0 + ξ1 ≤ D where D ≥ 0 in order to maximize W (ξ0, ξ1).
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Then, the government’s solution is given by
ξ0 = ξ¯0 ≡
(2 + β)A21 + 4
(
e1 +B − β(A0k1/20 + e0)
)
4(1 + β) (27)
ξ0 + ξ1 = B (28)
Here, we explicitly assume that ξ¯0 ∈ [−b0, B]. We also need ξ¯1 ≡ B − ξ¯0 > 0 in
order to ensure that q0 > 0.3
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
According to (27), the optimal level of ξ0 may be negative or positive. It depends
positively on A1, e1 but negatively on A0, k0, e0. Moreover, it depends positively on the
total amount B of dividends. This result complements the findings in Proposition 4
and Corollary 2.
It is easy to see that the optimal level of ξ0 is negative if the endowment at the initial
period A0k1/20 + e0 is high enough. It means that the country is rich enough (high k0
and e0) or/and has high productivity (high A0). This finding is totally consistent with
empirical data mentioned in the introduction: only rich countries experience negative
nominal interest rates. Moreover, our analyses in this example and Proposition 4
suggest that while a central bank encourages people to invest by reducing interest
rates (ECB, 2014), it is important for the economy to stimulate investments in R&D
in order to improve the productivity in the future.
The optimal level of ξ0 is positive if
• the productivity at the second period A1 is high enough, as in this situation, the
higher the investment at the initial period, the higher the level of output at the
second period. This is consistent with Corollary 2;
• or/and endowment at the second period e1 is high enough. Indeed, when the
economy has enough endowment at the second period, positive dividend at the
initial period may benefit consumption at this period and then the total welfare.
4 Asset valuation
In this section, we investigate the asset valuation by developing the standard asset
pricing for the case where dividends may be negative. By iterating (18) we have the
following decomposition
q0 =
( T∑
t=1
Qtξt
)
+QT qT ∀T ≥ 1. (29)
The price q0, the value of one unit of asset at date 0, equals the sum of two terms:
The first FV T0 ≡
∑T
t=1Qtξt is the sum of discounted values of dividends until date T ,
3As mentioned in Remark 1, in this two-period model, no agent buys the asset today if they will
not be able to resell this asset and have to pay an amount tomorrow.
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and the second one QT qT , called re-sold term, is the discounted value of one unit of
asset at date T . We also have a similar decomposition for the asset price at date t.
Qtqt =
( T∑
s=t+1
Qsξs
)
+QT qT ∀T > t. (30)
Consider the Lucas tree with the sequence of positive dividends (ξt). The standard
literature of asset pricing in infinite-horizon models (Tirole, 1982; Kocherlakota, 1992;
Santos and Woodford, 1997; Le Van and Pham, 2016) defines the fundamental value
of this asset by FV ≡ ∑∞t=1Qtξt and the bubble of this asset as the difference between
the equilibrium price and the fundamental value q0 − FV ; in some mild situations,
there is no bubble and we can compute the asset price by q0 = FV .
This standard approach is suitable for assets with positive dividends because∑Tt=1Qtξt
is increasing in T and so converges if ξt ≥ 0 for any t. However when we consider
assets whose dividends may be negative, there is a room for the divergence of the
series ∑t≥1Qtξt. Hence, the standard approach cannot be applied.
4.1 Asset value at infinity
A natural question concerns the behavior of the discounted value of one unit of
the asset in the long run, i.e., limt→Qtqt. This makes sense because in the case where
limt→Qtqt = 0, we can compute the asset price by q0 =
∑∞
t=1Qtξt. When dividends are
positive, thanks to the decomposition (29), Qtqt is bounded and decreasingly converges
to some value (which is referred to the bubble of asset price bubble). However, if
dividends may be negative, the story becomes more complicated. Let us start by
considering two particular cases.
Proposition 5 (Value and price of asset).
1. (Montrucchio, 2004; Le Van and Pham, 2014). Assume that ξt > 0 for any t. At
any equilibrium, both ∑Ts=t+1Qsξs and QT qT converge, and
Qsqt =
( ∞∑
s=t+1
Qsξs
)
+ lim
T→∞
QT qT .
Moreover, we have (i) (QT qT ) is decreasing in time T , and (ii) limT→∞QT qT > 0
if and only if ∑∞t=1(ξt/qt) <∞.
2. Assume that ξt ≤ 0 for any t. At any equilibrium with qt > 0 for any t, both∑T
s=t+1Qsξs and QT qT converge, and
Qtqt =
( ∞∑
s=t+1
Qsξs
)
+ lim
T→∞
QT qT .
Moreover, we have
(i) (QT qT )T is increasing in time T ,
(ii) lim
T→∞
QT qT < ∞ if and only if lim
T→∞
T∏
t=1
(1 + ξt
qt
) > 0, which is equivalent to
∞∑
t=1
−ξt
qt + ξt
< +∞, and this implies that ∞∑
t=1
−ξt
qt
< +∞.
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Proof. See Appendix A.7.
In Proposition 5, we see that Qtqt converges because either ξt ≥ 0 ∀t or ξt ≤ 0 ∀t.
However, in more general cases, Qtqt may diverge. This issue will be addressed in the
next section.
To understand the meaningful of Proposition 5’s point 2, let us observe the budget
constraint of agent i at date t
ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1− δ)ki,t + qtai,t ≤ rtki,t + (qt + ξt)ai,t−1 + ei,t + θitpit.
We see that one unit of asset bought at date t − 1 will give one unit of the same
asset and ξt units of consumption good (i.e., (qt + ξt) units of consumption good) at
date t. When ξt < 0, the ratio −ξtqt+ξt can be interpreted as the interest-to-value ratio
(proportion of interest to asset value) of asset at date t. By the way, point 2.ii shows
that asset value at infinity is finite if and only if the sum (over time) of interest-value
ratios is finite. This also implies that interest rate (in terms of asset), −ξt/qt, must
converge to zero.
4.2 Example: Positive asset prices with negative dividends
This section provides an example where the price of asset may be positive even its
dividends are negative at all dates.
Fundamentals of the economy. In this section, we will work under the following
setup. There are 2 consumers H and F with the same utility function and rate of time
preference: ui(c) = ln(c), βi = β ∈ (0, 1) ∀i = {H,F}. Their initial endowments are
respectively kH,0 = 0, aH,−1 = 0, kF,0 > 0, aF,−1 = 1. Their endowments are given by
(eH2t, eF2 ) = (et, 0), (eH2t+1, eF2t+1) = (0, et+1).
Assume that the production functions are given by F (K) = atK where at ≥ 0 and
β(1− δ + at) ≤ 1 for any t. Note that pit = 0 for any t.
We also need ∑∞s=1 βtln(et) <∞ to ensure that consumers’ utilities are finite.
Computing equilibria. With the above setup, equilibria can be computed as follows.
Allocations of the consumer H are given by
kH,2t = 0, aH,2t−1 = 0, kH,2t+1 = K2t+1, aH,2t = 1
cH,2t−1 = (1− δ + r2t−1)K2t−1 + q2t−1 + ξ2t−1, cH,2t = e2t −K2t+1 − q2t
while allocations of the consumer F are
kF,2t = K2t, aF,2t = 1, kF,2t+1 = 0, aF,2t = 0
cF,2t−1 = e2t−1 −K2t − q2t−1, cF,2t = (1− δ + r2t)K2t + q2t + ξ2t.
Prices and the aggregate capital are given by the following system: for any t,
pt = 1, rt = at, and
Kt+1 + qt =
β
1 + β et (31)
qt+1 + ξt+1 = qt(at+1 + 1− δ) (32)
qt ≥ 0, Kt > 0. (33)
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By using Lemma 2, we can verify that this sequence of allocations and prices is an
equilibrium. For short, we also call (Kt+1, qt)t≥0 equilibrium. It is easy to see that
Qt =
1
(1− δ + a1) · · · (1− δ + at) ; Qtqt = q0 −
t∑
s=1
Qsξs (34)
q0 ∈
(
0, βe01 + β
)
; 0 ≤ q0 −
t∑
s=1
ξs
(1− δ + a1) · · · (1− δ + as) <
βet
1 + β ∀t (35)
Example 2 (Multiple equilibrium prices). Assume at = δ and et = e for any t, then
γt = 1 and Qt = 1 for any t. For each q0 such that
q0 ∈
(
0, βe1 + β
)
, 0 < q0 −
t∑
s=1
ξs <
βe
1 + β ∀t, (36)
we determine
qt ≡ q0 −
t∑
s=1
ξs, Kt+1 ≡ βe1 + β − qt > 0. (37)
It is easy to see that (Kt+1, qt)t≥0 is an equilibrium and qt > 0 for any t.
In Example 2, we see that even when ξt is negative for any t, all asset prices
are positive. Let us explain the intuition of this fact. A fluctuation on wealth (or
endowments) creates a fluctuation on agents’ income. In the odd periods (2t + 1),
agent H has no endowment. She wants to smooth consumption over time but she
cannot transfer her wealth from the future back to this date because of borrowing
constraint. By consequence, she needs to transfer her wealth from date 2t to date
2t+ 1, hence she accepts to buy financial asset at date 2t with positive prices even this
asset brings negative dividends in the future. The same argument is applied for the
even periods and agent F . Therefore, asset prices are positive at any date.
This result is stronger than the existence of fiat money or of rational bubbles in
the general equilibrium context. Indeed, Bewley (1980), Tirole (1985), Kocherlakota
(1992), Pascoa et al. (2011), Hirano and Yanagawa (2017) point out that the price of
an asset without dividends (i.e., fiat money) may be positive.4 Santos and Woodford
(1997), Le Van and Pham (2016), Bosi et al. (2017) provide some examples where the
asset price is higher than the sum of discounted values of asset dividends (which are
always positive).
Remark 2. Let s ≥ 0. Take ξt = 0 for any t ≥ s and ξs < 0. In this case
∞∑
t=s+1
Qtξt =
0 < −ξs < Qsqs. This suggests that condition lim inf
t→∞ ξt > 0 in Corollary 1 is essential
in order to ensure that ∑∞t=s+1Qtξt > Qs|ξs|.
4This may happen in an OLG model (Tirole, 1985) if the real interest rate of the economy without
bubble asset is lower than the population growth rate
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4.3 Fluctuations of asset price and (discounted) value
Given an equilibrium, the conventional view5 is that the discounted value of one
unit of the asset (i.e., (Qtqt)t) is bounded from above and converges. This property
holds because the existing literature only considers the case where dividends are always
positive. In this section, we will investigate the behavior of (Qtqt) to know whether it
can diverge or converge when dividends may be negative.
Example 3. Consider again the example in Section 4.2 but we only require at = δ for
any t. It is easy to see that (Kt+1, qt)t≥0 determined by (31), (32), and (33), constitutes
an equilibrium if
q0 ∈
(
0, βe01 + β
)
, 0 ≤ q0 −
t∑
s=1
ξs <
βet
1 + β ∀t (38)
Notice that under these conditions, we have Qt = 1 and Qtqt = qt = q0 −∑ts=1 ξs.
Let us point out some consequences of Example 3.
1. Fluctuations of asset price and value. When we choose (ξt) such that (
∑t
s=1 ξs)t
diverges, then the sequence of asset prices (qt) diverges and so does (Qtqt).
In particular, we can choose q0 ∈
(
0, βe01+β
)
and (ξt) such that q0 −∑ts=1 ξs > 0
for any even t and q0 −∑ts=1 ξs = 0 for any odd t. Therefore, in general case,
asset price qt may be zero at infinitely many dates and it may also be positive at
infinitely many other dates.
2. Asset value converges to infinity. When we take (et) such that limt→∞ et = ∞
and βet1+β >
βb0
1+β −
t∑
s=1
ξs,6 we have that: Qtqt tends to infinity if and only if∑∞
s=1 ξs = −∞. According to point 2 of Proposition 5, this is equivalent to∑
t≥1
ξt
q0−(ξ1+···+ξt−1) = −∞.
5 Conclusion
When dividends may be negative, asset prices are positive only when the production
sector is strong enough and dividends are not so low. Our analysis suggests that when
the productivity in the future is high, issuing an asset in the present having negative
dividends in the future may increase the welfare.
It is hard to find out robust behaviors of asset prices and values when dividends
may be negative. The discounted value of one unit of asset Qtqt may fluctuate over
time. It may also converge to any positive value, even to infinity. Interestingly, asset
prices may be positive even dividends are negative at all dates.
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A Appendix: Formal proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (Bi,t) be defined by
Bi,0 ≡ (1− δ)ki,0 + ξ0ai,−1, Bi,t ≡ (1− δ)Bi,t−1 + ξtai,t−1.
We will show that: if Bi,t > 0 for any i, t then there exists an equilibrium with qt ≥ 0
and pt > 0 for any t. This can be done by adapting the argument in Le Van and Pham
(2016).
We have qt > 0 because there is an infinite sequence (ξtn)n such that ξtn > 0 for
any t
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
By iterating (18) we have the following decomposition
q0 =
( T∑
t=1
Qtξt
)
+QT qT ∀T ≥ 1 (A.1)
Qtqt =
( T∑
s=t+1
Qsξs
)
+QT qT ∀T > t. (A.2)
We see that there exists ξ > 0 and t0 > s such that ξt ≥ ξ for any t ≥ t0. So, when
T is high enough, the sequence (FV T0 ≡
∑T
t=1Qtξt)T>t0 is increasing in T . Moreover,
FV T0 ≤ q0 for any T . By consequence, FV T0 converges to FV0 ≡
∑∞
t=1Qtξt < ∞ and
hence Qtqt converge. Since lim inft→∞ ξt > 0, we get that
∑∞
t=1Qt <∞.
According to point 2 of Lemma 1, et+F (Kt) is uniformly bounded from above. As a
result, we obtain that limT→∞QTki,T+1 = 0 for any i, and so
∑∞
t=1(et+F (Kt)Qt) <∞
because et is also uniformly bounded from above.
For each agent i, we rewrite her/his budget constraint at date t as follows
Qtci,t +Qtki,t+1 +Qtqtai,t = Qt(rt + 1− δ)ki,t +Qt(qt + ξt)ai,t−1 + (ei,t + θipit)Qt.
By summing the budget constraints from t equals 0 to t, and use (17), (18), we get
that ( T∑
t=0
Qtci,t
)
+QTki,T+1 +QT qTai,T
= (r0 + 1− δ)ki,0 + (q0 + ξ0)ai,−1 +
T∑
t=0
(ei,t + θipit)Qt < +∞
where the last inequality is from the fact that ∑∞t=1 (et + F (Kt))Qt <∞.
We have QT qTai,T +QTki,T+1 ≥ 0, hence ∑∞t=0Qtci,t < +∞, and then (QTki,T+1 +
QT qTai,T )T converges where T tends to infinity. Since limT→+∞QTki,T+1 = 0, the
sequence (QT qTai,T )T will converge.
18
If limT→+∞QT qT > 0, then ai,T converges for any i. By consequence, there exists
i such that lim
t→+∞ ai,t > 0. For such an agent, there exists T such that the ai,t > 0 for
any t ≥ T . Thus, Qt
QT
= Qi,t
Qi,T
for any t ≥ T . According to condition (13) in Lemma 2,
we have
lim
t→+∞Qtqtai,t =
QT
Qi,T
lim
t→∞Qi,tqtai,t = 0
which is a contradiction. We conclude that QT qT converges to 0. Therefore, it is easy
to see that qt =
∑∞
s=t+1Qsξs/Qt > 0 for any t > t0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Point 1. Let an equilibrium such that γi,t = γt for any t > t0 and for any i.
According to point (iii) of Lemma 2, we have limt→∞Qt
(
qtai,t + ki,t+1
)
= 0 for any i.
This implies that limt→∞Qtqt = limt→∞QtKt+1 = 0. By combining this with (A.2),
we obtain Qtqt =
∞∑
s=t+1
Qsξs.
Point 2 is a direct consequence of point 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of point (1). According to Lemma 5, we have F (Dt−1) + Dt−1 ≥ ξt ≥ d > 0
for any t. So, Dt is bounded away from zero.
By definition, we have
Dt = et + F (Dt−1) + (1− δ)Dt−1 + max(0, ξt)
= F (Dt−1) + (1− δ)Dt−1 < (F ′(0) + 1− δ)Dt−1.
Since F ′(0) < δ, we obtain that Dt converges to zero, a contradiction.
Proof of point (2). By definition, we have Dt ≥ Ct + Kt+1, so both Ct and Kt+1
converge to zero.
If ξt does not converge to zero, there exist ξ > 0 and an infinite sequence (tn)n such
that ξtn ≤ −ξ for any n. Hence, F (Ktn) + (1 − δ)Ktn ≥ −ξtn ≥ ξ > 0. So, Ktn is
bounded away from zero, a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
By Lemma 1 and Assumption H4, the problem (PW) has a solution. Let (ct, kt+, ξt)t
be a solution of this problem. We have first order conditions
λt = βtu′(ct) (A.3)
λ = λt + µt, µt(ξt + bt) = 0 (A.4)
λt = λt+1G′t+1(kt+1) (A.5)
for any t, where λt, µt, λ are non-negative multipliers associated to constraints (24),
(25), (26) respectively.
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We fix a date t.
Suppose that ξt > −bt, then µt = 0. We have
1 = λ
λ
= λt
λt+1 + µt+1
≤ λt
λt+1
= G′t+1(kt+1). (A.6)
We will claim that Gt(Kt) tends to infinity when At tends to infinity. Indeed,
suppose Gt(Kt) is bounded, then the sequence (ct)t is bounded and so is the welfare.
However, it is easy to see the the welfare tends to infinity when At tends to infinity
because u(∞) = F (∞) =∞.
We now prove that Kt+1 tends to infinity when At tends to infinity. Suppose that
Kt+1 is bounded, then limAt→∞ ct =∞ (because ct + kt+1 = Gt(kt) + et + ξt). We see
that (ct+1) is bounded because Kt+1 is bounded. Hence u′(ct+1) and G′t+1(kt+1) are
bounded away from zero.
By FOCs, we get that
1 = βu
′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
G′t+1(kt+1).
Hence, u′(ct) is also bounded away from zero. We have a contradiction because
limAt→∞ ct =∞ and u′(∞) = 0.
Therefore, we have proved that Kt+1 tends to infinity when At tends to infinity.
This implies that lim
At→∞
G′t+1(kt+1) = 1 − δ < 1, a contradiction to (A.6). Finally, we
get ξt = −bt < 0.
A.6 Proof of Example 1
It is easy to see that W (ξ0, D − ξ0) is differentiable. We have, by noting that
u′(c0) = βu′(c1)G′1(k1),
∂W
∂ξ0
= u′(c0)− ∂k1
∂ξ0
u′(c0)− βu′(c1) + βu′(c1)G′1(k1)
∂k1
∂ξ0
(A.7)
= u′(c0)− βu′(c1) = βu′(c1)(G′1(k1)− 1). (A.8)
We now compute G′1(k1). Euler condition u′(c0) = βu′(c1)G′1(k1) implies that
A1k
1/2
1 + e1 + ξ1 = β
1
2A1k
−1/2
1 (A0k
1/2
0 + e0 + ξ0 − k1).
Hence, (1 + β 12)A1k1 + (e1 +D− ξ0)k1/21 − β 12A1(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0). So, we can find
that
k
1/2
1 =
−(e1 +D − ξ0) +
√
(e1 +D − ξ0)2 + β(2 + β)A21(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)
(2 + β)A1
. (A.9)
Thus, condition G′1(k1) ≥ 1 becomes
1
2A1(2 + β)A1
−(e1 +D − ξ0) +
√
(e1 +D − ξ0)2 + β(2 + β)A21(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)
≥ 1
⇔
1
2A1(2 + β)A1
(
e1 +D − ξ0 +
√
(e1 +D − ξ0)2 + β(2 + β)A21(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)
)
β(2 + β)A21(A0k
1/2
0 + e0 + ξ0)
≥ 1.
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This inequality is equivalent to√
(e1 +D − ξ0)2 + β(2 + β)A21(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0) ≥ 2β(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)− (e1 +D − ξ0).
(A.10)
When the right hand side of (A.10) is positive, this inequality becomes
β(2 + β)A21(A0k
1/2
0 + e0 + ξ0) ≥ 4β2(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)2 − 4β(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)(e1 +D − ξ0)
⇔ (2 + β)A21 ≥ 4β(A0k1/20 + e0 + ξ0)− 4(e1 +D − ξ0).
So, we find that: ∂W
∂ξ0
= 0 if and only if ξ0 = ξ¯0. We also check that the right hand
side of (A.10) is positive when ξ0 = ξ¯0.
The solution is unique because the welfare function W is concave.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
According to (18), we have Qtqt = Qt+1qt+1(1 + ξt+1qt+1 ) for any t, so
q0 = (1 +
ξ1
q1
)q1Q1 = (1 +
ξ1
q1
)(1 + ξ2
q2
)q2Q2
= . . . = (1 + ξ1
q1
) · · · (1 + ξT
qT
)qTQT .
Point (1). lim
T→∞
QT qT > 0 if and only if lim
T→∞
(1 + ξ1
q1
) · · · (1 + ξT
qT
) < ∞, which is
equivalent to
∞∑
t=1
(ξt/qt) <∞.
Point (2). We see that lim
T→∞
QT qT <∞ if and only if lim
T→∞
(1 + ξ1
q1
) · · · (1 + ξT
qT
) > 0.
Denote dt = −ξt ≥ 0. We observe that
1 + ξt
qt
= 1− dt
qt
= 1
1 + dt
qt−dt
.
Therefore, lim
T→∞
T∏
t=1
(1− dt
qt
) > 0 if and only if lim
T→∞
T∏
t=1
(1+ dt
qt−dt ) <∞ which is equivalent
to
∞∑
t=1
dt
qt − dt <∞.
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